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5.1  Introduction 
The income redistribution ability of government is severely limited. In 
the public finance literature, there has been considerable recent research 
exploring questions of taxation and public production where the potential 
gains from income redistribution are sizable. In some, but not all, cases 
the need for income redistribution changes the desirable rules for tax and 
production policy. In this paper a similar approach is taken to questions 
of  protection and trade adjustment assistance. The focus is on the dis- 
tribution of  income among workers and the use of  output and labor 
movement subsidization to maximize social welfare. 
Protection policy can come in many forms including subsidies, tariffs, 
and quotas. In this paper I shall only consider subsidies. It is politically 
understandable that firms seek tariffs or quotas rather than subsidies. For 
the model analyzed here, subsidies are the efficient method of protection 
when protection is desired. Thus the analysis is simplified by considering 
them rather than tariffs which would introduce further distortion. The 
differences among subsidies, tariffs,  and  quotas are sufficiently well 
known that the reader will have no difficulty extending the analysis, 
should that be wanted. Similarly, I analyze a competitive industry, leav- 
ing to the reader the adaptation to other market settings. 
Trade adjustment assistance is  available separately to firms and to 
workers.' This paper considers only financial aid going to workers. There 
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are many issues involved in the question of  when it is socially advan- 
tageous to use public resources to improve and maintain firms that might 
otherwise go out of business. These issues are, in part, very different from 
those relevant for analysis  of workers, whose continued existence is taken 
as given. Analysis of  aid to firms that comes to grips with the efficiency 
and behavior of  firms would be very interesting. 
Adjustment assistance to workers comes in the form of  services and 
advice as well as cash-McCarthy  (1975) suggests that the former may 
well  be very important in helping workers respond  to their  changed 
environment.  Nevertheless,  this  analysis will  only  consider  financial 
assistance for workers who are well able to look after their own interests. 
To go further would again raise a number of  very different (and very 
interesting) issues. 
When an industry is in long-term decline, the workers in the industry 
are likely to be poorer than taxpayers generally. Thus there is an equity 
basis for subsidizing the output of  the industry to raise wages in the 
industry. Taken alone, this subsidy has the side effect of  inefficiently 
decreasing exit from the industry. Even workers exiting from a declining 
industry are likely to be poorer than taxpayers generally. Thus there is an 
equity basis for subsidizing moving costs. Taken alone, this subsidy has 
the side effect of inefficiently encouraging too much exit from the indus- 
try. Combining these two policies, we have a gain in equity with offsetting 
incentives on exit. This paper explores the workings of and limitations on 
this combination of  policies. 
In section 5.2 is developed a simple model of  a two-industry economy 
with labor as the sole factor of production. The model is used to derive 
optimal policies of  protection and adjustment assistance. The special 
assumptions of  the model are discussed in section 5.3. Sections 5.4  and 
5.5 examine the case for adjustment assistance once one recognizes the 
prior existence of  income taxation  and unemployment compensation. 
This analysis was developed after reading McCarthy’s analysis of  the 
Massachusetts shoe industry, an industry in long-term decline. I have not 
asked how typical this industry is of recipients of  adjustment assistance. 
At several places in the analysis, the results would be different if  adjust- 
ment assistance were going to industries with only temporary difficulties. 
5.2  One-Period Model 
The basic elements of  the analysis are brought out in this section in a 
one-period linear model. We consider an economy with two industries. 
The A  industry is the one suffering from foreign competition. The B 
industry represents the rest of  the economy. This is small-country analy- 
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market. For ease of interpretation of the equations we will distinguish the 
two absolute prices pA and pB. The economy has workers, but no other 
factors of  production. 
At the start of the single period, each worker is located in one industry 
or the other. There are two consequences to being a worker in a particu- 
lar industry. One is that workers are assumed to be skilled in their trades 
and to become unskilled should they switch industries. A skilled worker 
has s times the marginal product of  an unskilled worker. We shall mea- 
sure output so that the marginal product of an unskilled worker is equal to 
one (which is assumed to be independent of the number of  other work- 
ers). The second consequence of different initial placements is that there 
is  a moving cost  associated with  switching industries.  The costs are 
different for different workers. We will refer to a c worker as one with 
moving costs equal to c and denote by N(c)  the number of workers in the 
A industry with moving costs less than or equal to c. For convenience we 
will assume that there are some workers with moving costs c for every 
positive value of  c,  N' (c) > 0 for c > 0. NA and Ns  are the numbers of 
workers in each industry at the start of  the period. Apart from location 
and moving costs, all workers are the same.2  We denote by  v(Z; pA,  pB) 
the indirect utility function of a worker having income I  and facing prices 
pA andpB.  This will often be shortened to v (I)  when there is no confusion. 
We  assume that the relevant  normalization for social welfare has  v 
concave in I. 
We begin by considering full welfare optimization assuming the use of 
ideal lump-sum taxation. Since this model does not violate any assump- 
tions of the Arrow-Debreu model, any Pareto optimum is achievable as a 
competitive equilibrium with appropriate lump-sum redistribution. Thus 
we need not consider any other policy tools until we start second-best 
analysis. Ideal lump-sum taxation has two characteristics-taxes  can be 
different for different individuals and taxes do not vary with individual 
behavior. Since taxes do not vary, individuals decide whether or not to 
move by  comparing income without moving to income net of  moving 
costs. 
We assume that the A industry is in decline in the sense that pA <  pB. 
With workers receiving their  marginal products, this implies that the 
workers who stay in the A  industry have lower earned income than 
workers who stay in the B industry. Lump-sum taxation to maximize the 
sum of utilities will then transfer income from B workers to A workers to 
equate incomes. 
If pA is sufficiently close to pB for the loss of  skill from moving to be 
more important than the lower price, spA 5: pB, then no workers will 
choose to move. In this case the lump-sum transfers will be the same for 
all A workers and will equate incomes across industries while balancing 
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SPA +  ZA =  SPB +  ZB, 
NAZA  + NBZB  = 0, 
(1) 
where ZA  and ZB are lump-sum transfers to workers in the two industries 
(with  ZB < 0 corresponding  to lump-sum taxation).  Since these  are 
lump-sum taxes, they depend on the individual and not his choice of 
industry-someone  choosing to switch industries does not change his 
lump-sum transfer. 
If  pA declines below pB/s,  individuals will  choose to move.  Since 
lump-sum transfers do  not change with the moving decision, workers with 
moving costs below c:  will move, where the c$  worker has the same 
income in either industry: 
(2)  spA=pB-Cg*. 
Recalling that A workers are skilled in the A industry but unskilled in the 
B industry, the higher price of B output just offsets a c:  worker’s moving 
costs and loss in skill. 
In the absence of  lump-sum transfers B workers would be better off 
than movers who would be better off  than those staying as A workers. 
Ideal lump-sum taxation will equate the incomes of all workers. Denote 
by Z, the lump-sum transfer to a c worker. For c >  c$,  the worker stays in 
the A industry. All such workers are in the same position and have the 
same lump-sum income  ZA. For c <  c$ ,  lump-sum income Z,  will vary with 
c. These transfers equate all incomes and satisfy the government budget 
constraint: 
For familiar reasons of limited information and administrative costs, this 
type of redistribution is assumed to be infeasible. Thus we shall consider a 
restricted set of  policy tools. 
5.2.1  Second Best 
For constrained  welfare maximization, we  consider the use of  two 
policy tools. The protection tool is the subsidization of  output of the A 
industry. Let (Y be one plus the ad valorem subsidy rate. The adjustment 
assistance tool is the subsidization of moving costs. Let p be one minus 
the ad  valorem subsidy rate.3 These programs are financed by  a poll 
tax-an  equal per capita tax on all workers in the economy. Such a tax is 
feasible even when it is not feasible to ideally set lump-sum taxes which 
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ing on the level OfpA. Forp,  L  pB/s, it is inefficient to have any workers 
move. There is then no reason not to protect the A industry at a sufficient 
level to equate worker incomes in the two industries, apA =pe. In this 
case the poll tax TI  must satisfy 
(5)  (NA  + NB)Ti = (CY  -  1)spANA. 
With all incomes equated, social welfare satisfies 
Note that this equilibrium is feasible for anypA,  not only high ones. The 
question is when this policy is optimal also for values of pA below pB/s. 
The alternative policy is to restrict a  so that some mobility occurs. This 
is only possible when spA < pB. In this case, the worker who is just 
indifferent to moving has costs satisfying. 
(7)  WpA =pB -  pc*. 
The level of  poll tax T2 needed to finance these programs satisfies 
(8)  (N!  +NB)G=(~-  ~)~PA(NA-N(c*)) 
C* 
+ (1 -  p)J  cdN(c). 
0 
At fixed subsidy rates, an increase in c*,  increasing the number of moving 
workers, lowers the cost of protection and raises the cost of  adjustment 
assistance. 
Protection encourages workers to stay in the A industry. Adjustment 
assistance encourages them to leave. For each level of  movement be- 
tween industries N(c*),  there is a locus of  pairs of subsidy levels which 
will give the same amount of movement. These loci are shown in figure 
5.1. All are straight lines passing through the point (PBIsPA,  0). The locus 
that also passes through the point (1,l) has the same amount of  move- 
ment as would occur in the absence of intervention. We shall consider the 
optimal pair of policies (a,  p) as well as the optimal CY for arbitrary p and 
vice versa. 
Moving to the right along a constant movement locus, both protection 
and adjustment assistance increase, as do the lump-sum taxes to finance 
the subsidies. On the locus where the c* worker is the marginal worker, 
taxes satisfy 
(9)  (NA  +  NB)  T2 = (a  -  l)SPA (NA -  N(c*)) 128  Peter A. Diamond 
I 
Fig. 5.1  Constant mobility loci 
Thus the increase in taxes as subsidization increases satisfies 
The B workers have incomes that fall at the rate of 
dT.1 
aa  cI 
as we move to the right along such a locus. The A workers have incomes 
that rise at the rate 
da 
I.'".  + i=*@*  -  c)W(c)] 
The c' workers who move have incomes that change at the rate 129  Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution 
This expression is positive for high values of c' and negative for low ones. 
Thus movement to the right along this locus implies redistribution from 
the better to the worse off and welfare improves as we move toward the 
point where p = 0 and a  = PBhpA, i.e., the point where everyone is 
indifferent to m~ving.~  At this point the movers and the A workers have 
utility v(pB - G),  while the B workers have utility v (spB - T,), where T, 
satisfies (9). To determine the optimum, we need to select c*. 
In deciding how many workers should move, the government wants to 
minimize the tax burden since minimizing & maximizes both v(pB - T,) 
and v(spB - T,). This occurs at the same level of  movement as in the 
laissez-faire equilibrium N(c$),  since this maximizes the value of  net 
output at world  price^.^ 
To complete the analysis of welfare maximization we must determine 
the values of pA for which this equilibrium is better than the equilibrium 
with no movement and equalized incomes. With equalized incomes and 
no  interindustry  movement, welfare satisfies (6).  In the constrained 
optimum with movement, welfare satisfies 
(13)  wZ  =  NAv (PB -  TZ)  + NBv  (spB -  T2) 7 
where 
(NA +  NB)G = (PB -  (NA -  N(c*)) 
+  ['"c  dN(c), 
(14)  c* =c$=pB-spAIpB. 
To compare alternative policies, let us assume that workers do not 
consume the output of the A industry, so the only effect of a higher pA is 
higher incomes of all workers. With equalized incomes and no movement 
we have full equality but inefficiency. With movement we have efficiency 
but inequality. We would expect the former policy to be better when spA 
is close toPB and so movement is unimportant. This is the case since Wl  > 
W, at  pB = spA.  Protection alone can be the preferred policy even atpA = 
0 for suitable utility function and sufficiently large s. Table 5.1 compares 
the alternative policies. 
For the stronger result that W1 is preferred if  and only if pA exceeds a 
critical value, we have a sufficient condition of  increasing absolute risk 130  Peter A. Diamond 
Table 5.1  Alternative Policies 
Protection and 
Only Protection  Assistance 
Q  P~PA  P  dSPA 
P  1  0 
C*  0  Co’ 
T  TI  T2 
aversion. To see that this is the case, we differentiate social welfare with 
respect to pA in both cases: 
When  Wl  equals Wz,  W, is increasing more  rapidly with decreasing 
absolute risk aversion since 
As pA gets larger, the efficiency loss from no movement gets smaller 
(sNA  >s(NA -  N(c,*))).  For the redistribution gain to get larger, we need 
redistribution to be more important the greater the income level. This 
latter condition is not generally plausible, so the areas of  dominance of 
each policy are not necessarily connected. 
5.2.2  Single-Policy Tool 
We have considered the simultaneous optimization of protection and 
trade adjustment. We now consider the use of each of  these tools sepa- 
rately, the other tool held constant and assuming a sufficiently low pA to 
justify some movement out of the A industry. The result of these calcula- 
tions is that the optimum occurs with greater concern for income distribu- 
tion than is  the case if  the free policy variable is set to produce the 
no-intervention level of movement.6  This is shown in figure 5.2, where it 
is assumed that the social indifference curves are well behaved. Even 
when this is not the case, the optimum has the properties mentioned 
above. 
With the policy tools set at arbitrary levels, social welfare satisfies 131  Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution 
PI3 
SPA 
tl  - 
Fig. 5.2  Social indifference curves 
w=  NA  -N(c*) v(WpA -  T)  [I 
(17)  +  [‘“(pB  -  pc -  T)dN(c) 
+ NBV  (sps -  T) 
where c* satisfies (7) and Tsatisfies (8). The derivative of  W with respect 
to the poll tax T equals minus the average marginal utility of income of 
taxpayers in the economy, which is defined as 132  Peter A. Diamond 
Provided there are  some movers in the economy,’ B workers have greater 
income than movers who have greater income than A workers. Writing 
these marginal utilities as 6  and v;,  we have 
(19)  $IV’(olsp~  -  T)>7  >V’(Sps-  T)ZV’. 
In addition we assume that the B industry is sufficiently larger than the A 
industry that the marginal utility of  income of all the movers exceeds the 
average marginal utility of  a taxpayer: 
(20)  V’(pB  -  T)>Z 
With this additional assumption, we can evaluate the derivatives of  W: 
(NA -  N(c*))spAVi -  7(NA  +  NB)-  dT 
aa  aa 
= (NA -  N(c*))s~,v~  -  (NA -  N(c*)) 
- 
-  v’N’(c*)aC*(c*  -  Ci), 
aa 
= ic*  -  v’(pe -  pc -  T)cdN(c) 
= 6“  -  v’  (pe -  pc -  T)cdN(c)  -  7  [ -  dl’cdN(c) 
- 
-  v’N’(c*)aC*(c*  -  co). 
ap 
Considering the derivative with respect to a,  we note that the first term is 
positive and the second is also positive when c* >  c$ since c* decreases 
with a.  Thus, to find a value of a  for which a W/da  is zero, we must have c* 133  Protection, Trade Adjustment  Assistance, and Income Distribution 
<  co. Thus protection is carried beyond the point where the decline of the 
industry equals that in the absence of intervention. With protection as the 
only available tool, incomes of  A workers are raised above the level 
which gives the no-intervention level of  movement. 
Considering the derivative with respect to p, we note that the first term 
is negative (by assumption [20]) and the second is also negative for c* <  co 
since c* is decreasing with p. Thus, to raise the incomes of movers, trade 
assistance is carried beyond the point which would yield the same move- 
ment as in the absence of  intervention. Assuming they are well behaved 
(as need not be true), social indifference curves would appear as in figure 
5.2, where p* and a*  mark optimal policies for arbitrary policies a. and 
Po, respectively. 
5.3  Discussion of  the Model 
The analysis above uses a particularly simple model of an economy and 
has no policy variables other than the ones being analyzed. In this section 
we consider informally more general models of the economy. In the next 
two sections we reconsider these policy tools in the presence of  income 
taxation and unemployment compensation. In Appendix C is a further 
discussion in responce to questions raised at the conference. 
First, let us recap the basics of the analysis. We start with an industry 
where workers have low wages because of a fall in the world price of their 
output. The alternative to staying at low wages is to move out of  the 
industry, bearing moving costs and a loss in skill. To improve income 
distribution, it is desirable to help these workers. If  the fall in output price 
is not too large, the most efficient way to help them is to protect the 
industry, stifling movement out of the industry if  there would be any. If 
the fall in output price is large, this policy is too expensive in terms of the 
efficiency loss from immobility. A better policy is then to have a lower 
rate of  protection and to encourage mobility by subsidizing movement 
costs-that  is, having trade assistance. By coordinating these two policies 
with the single margin of movement, it is possible to preserve the efficient 
level of movement. If  only one of these two tools is available, it should be 
used with greater concern for income distribution than would preserve 
the efficient level of  movement. 
We turn now to considering various special aspects of  the model. We 
shall consider the absence of  capital, the use of  a linear technology, the 
assumption of an inelastic labor supply, the use of  a one-period model, 
the absence of  firms and new workers, and the simple form of  moving 
costs. The absence of domestic distortions (like excise taxation) avoids 
the familiar second-best complications of coordinating different policies 
or adapting to their noncoordination. 134  Peter A. Diamond 
5.3.1  Absence of  Capital 
We have used a model with a single factor of production. To add more 
factors (capital for example) we  would need to consider the extent to 
which other factors were mobile. If capital were immobile, we would only 
have to take account of the fact that protection raises the return to capital 
in the A industry. To evaluate this effect we would need to know the 
extent to which ownership of the A industry was narrow or wide through 
the stock market or indebtedness of the firms and then the income levels 
of  the capital income recipients relative to that of  taxpayers. To the 
extent that capital is mobile, protection would also retard movement out 
of  the industry and so efficiency. Presumably these effects weaken the 
case for protection (relative to that stated above) and thus also weaken 
the case for trade adjustment assistance. Whether the case for protection 
disappears altogether would depend on the particulars of the case. Even 
if  no protection is warranted, we have seen that there remains a case for 
trade adjustment assistance. 
5.3.2  Linear Technology 
The model assumed that the marginal products of  labor in the two 
industries were independent of the numbers of workers in the two indus- 
tries. With strictly concave production functions, labor mobility raises the 
wages of  those remaining behind and lowers the wages in the industry 
receiving the additional labor. This change in the model does not alter the 
basic argument. In addition, with concave production functions there is a 
residual profit in both industries. Any change in the level of  movement 
will change the two levels of  profits and, in general, the aggregate too. 
The determinants of the sign of the effect are derived in appendix A.  This 
indirect effect is in addition to the indirect effect of protection in raising 
profits. Being ambiguous in sign, this indirect effect could work either 
way in determining the desirable size of  policies. 
5.3.3  Inelastic Labor Supply 
With labor supply variable, redistribution by raising wages involves a 
distortion not present with lump-sum redistribution. Institutional limita- 
tions on hours may  make this point  of  little significance. Otherwise, 
optimal protection is presumably reduced somewhat, although the de- 
sirability of some protection is unaffected. 
Labor supply can also be variable because new workers are coming into 
the A industry. If protection raises the number of such workers, we have a 
further distortion. This is unlikely to be a real issue in a seriously declin- 
ing industry. 
5.3.4  One Period Model 
By considering a one-period model, we have ignored historical reasons 
for workers in the two industries to be systematically different as well as 135  Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution 
the effects of  the anticipation of  these policies on earlier entry into this 
industry. Both of  these points are illustrated by  considering a perfect 
foresight two-period model where workers know that the time trend OfpA 
is down relative to pB.  Let us assume that without government interven- 
tion individuals are just indifferent to the choice of industry at the start of 
period one, (pA(l)  +pA(2)/(1+ r))  = (pB(l)  +pB(2)/(1  + I)). Having 
the same lifetime incomes, workers who plan to stay in either industry in 
both periods have the same consumption plan. Having different time 
streams of  earnings, they have different savings, with the A  workers 
having greater wealth at the start of period two. Even though A workers 
have lower wages than B workers, they both have the same consumption 
level, giving no reason  for redistribution.  Even more striking is the 
position of those low-moving-cost workers who shift from A to B. They 
are the best off in the economy as revealed by their willingness to move. 
This ex post behavior has the ex ante implication that low-moving-cost 
workers are particularly attracted to the A industry, which is appropriate. 
Full subsidization of moving costs would undercut this incentive to attract 
those who are most efficient in moving. 
While this model illustrates what can go wrong with naive application 
of  the one-period model, it is unrealistic for the plight of  the Mas- 
sachusetts shoe workers.  (It may be accurate for the Alaska pipeline 
workers.)  It is  not  simple to evaluate the effects of  protection  and 
adjustment assistance on prior entry into particular industries in the face 
of  uncertainty about future prices. Both expectation formation and sav- 
ings behavior are underdeveloped areas of empirical economics, making 
it hard to quantify these effects. The fact of many missing markets in the 
presence of  price uncertainty makes it hard to evaluate whatever effects 
occur. In this setting laisser-faire has no privileged claim to  efficiency; the 
indirect effects of income redistribution policies may be favorable rather 
than unfavorable.8 
5.3.5  Absence of  Firms 
The model recognizes two industries but distinguishes neither firms 
within the industry nor separate plants  of  indivdual firms. Declining 
industries are marked by the closing of  plants and the bankruptcies of 
firms. While many workers are reemployed in other plants of  the same 
firm or other firms, it is unlikely that this mechanism works with the 
efficiency assumed of mobility in the model. While this issue would be of 
relevance for analysis of  the desirability of  assistance to prevent  the 
closing of  plants or firms, it plays little role in consideration of  aid to 
workers who move after shutdown. While protection tends to decrease 
plant  shutdown, adjustment  assistance makes workers less willing to 
accept low wages to keep plants open. Thus there remains a trade-off in 
policies to approximately preserve the mobility level. 136  Peter A. Diamond 
Another facet of the existence of firms is the existence of uniform wage 
schedules. Layoff by  firms will tend to be based on marginal products 
(which vary) relative to wages (which may not). Moving costs and skill 
losses are thus not the sole selection criterion for workers to move. Since 
concern about the costs of  moving affect both productivity and wage 
bargaining, it is not obvious how far reality differs from the simple model. 
5.3.6  Moving Costs 
We have modeled individual moving costs as unaffected by their sub- 
sidization. There are three  types of  costs-foregone  wages, financial 
moving costs, and psychological costs. We would expect increases in the 
level  or extent  of  unemployment  benefits  to  affect job  acceptance 
criteria. This will  be  discussed below.  Whether the subsidization of 
relocation expenses involves any distortions depends on the rules under 
which they are paid. Some forms of  payment could lead to inefficiency 
because of  the substitution of  subsidized costs for unsubsidized costs. 
Depending on details, this might decrease the desirable level of subsidiza- 
tion, but does not remove the case for its existence. Psychological costs 
cannot be  subsidized in  the same way  as financial costs. If  formally 
introduced, they would enter the model in a parallel way to the loss in 
skill. 
Another complication arises once we recognize that different indi- 
viduals have different relative skills in the two industries. Since moving 
decisions reflect both skill losses and moving costs, differential treatment 
of these two elements will induce inefficiency. Appendix B extends the 
model to this case. 
5.4  Income Taxation 
In the absence of  any other policies it is straightforward to make the 
income redistribution case for many market intervention policies. It is 
difficult to ignore the fact that the United States has a personal income 
tax, as do most other countries. There are then two bases for a primarily 
redistributive policy. One is that the political process has resulted in an 
income tax which has less redistribution than might be de~ired.~  The other 
is that even the optimal use of an income tax can be improved upon by the 
coordinated use of  supplementary policies in a complicated economy.'o 
Both of these arguments strike me as valid. Since it would be off the main 
topic to discuss my views of the appropriate level of redistribution in the 
United States, I will confine my  remarks to the second issue. 
Apart from political limitations, income redistribution is limited by the 
induced  inefficiencies of  high  marginal tax  rates.  Thus one can  ask 
whether incentives create less of  a problem for helping the beneficiaries 
of  these policies than for individuals at the same income level in the 137  Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution 
general economy. There is a major argument which appears plausible, 
although I have not done any formal modeling to check its validity. When 
a poor group is separated out, its taxes can be reduced without necessarily 
affecting the taxes of  those higher up the income distribution (except 
through the government budget constraint). This eases the strain be- 
tween the taxes of low- and high-income individuals which comes from a 
nonlinear income tax structure. The critical element for this argument is 
that identification as a sufferer from import competition be negatively 
correlated with income, a plausible hypothesis." 
Most discussions of income taxation take place in one-period models. 
Yet for many government policies there appears to be greater concern for 
declining income than for low income per se (for example, social secu- 
rity), requiring use of a multiperiod model. While this outcome might just 
represent the relative political powers of  those with low incomes and 
those subject to income declines, consideration of intertemporal models 
does raise insurance bases for concern about declining income. This is 
particularly the case once one recognizes the intertemporal dependence 
of  individual utility functions and so the particular dislike of  declining 
living standards. The relatively undeveloped state of this area limits this 
issue to a suggestion for future research. 
5.5  Unemployment Compensation 
In the United States, the annual income tax is already supplemented by 
unemployment compensation. Adjustment assistance increases the level 
and duration of  benefits. Thus it is appropriate, again, to ask whether 
there is a case for a larger program for workers in industries hurt by 
foreign competition. In answering, it seems useful to distinguish declining 
industries from those temporarily hurt-that  is, to distinguish between 
industries from which there is steady exit and those needing temporary 
layoffs. 
In the previous section it was argued that the presence of a progressive 
income tax did not eliminate the case for using additional tools to provide 
income to poor groups. By identifying a separate group, it becomes 
possible to transfer income to that group without lessening the taxes of 
those higher up the income distribution. Here we consider a different 
issue. Assuming the recipients of  unemployment compensation to have 
approximately the same lifetime income levels as the recipients of trade 
adjustment assistance, is there a case for supplementing unemployment 
compensation  for those  laid  off  from  declining industries?  Since the 
theory of  unemployment compensation is relatively underdeveloped, I 
will identify questions that need answering rather than reasons for the 
existing program. Thus I shall review the issues about unemployment 
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trade-impacted workers. First, we will consider conditions of their layoff, 
then the characteristics of  the workers. 
Unemployment  compensation  provides  automatic stabilization for 
business cycles. Presumably the layoffs of  trade-impacted workers are 
less correlated with general business declines than general layoffs. This 
offers no basis for supplementary benefits. 
Baily (1977) and Flemming (1978) have argued that unemployment 
compensation is a form of worker insurance. The risk aversion of work- 
ers, compounded by  capital market imperfections, gives considerable 
scope for insurance to ease the burden of this risk. From this perspective, 
the insurance provided is limited by its effects on worker behavior, to 
which we turn next. Conceivably remaining a long time in a declining 
industry  might  make  trade-impacted  workers  more  risk  averse than 
others. The question could be approached by comparing the wealth levels 
of  different groups of  the unemployed. 
Unemployment  compensation  affects incentives for layoffs, search 
intensity, and job acceptance.12  Precisely because these workers come 
from a declining industry there is not the same concern for the excessive 
use of temporary layoffs. The argument would not be the same if  adjust- 
ment assistance were available for industries which were temporarily 
impacted by foreign trade. 
Much of  the discussion of  the incentives created by  unemployment 
compensation  assumes that  there  are no externalities caused by  the 
behavior of  the unemployed.  Then, benefits play the same role as a 
distorting tax and we have the familiar trade-off of efficiency with equity 
and insurance. However, once one recognizes the lags and imperfections 
in the flows of information in the labor market it is not plausible to assume 
an absence of externalities caused by the behavior of the unemployed. 
Greater search intensity by the unemployed generates external econo- 
mies to jobs which are filled as a consequence of this additional search.” 
Greater selectivity in job acceptance increases vacancies, and so the rate 
and quality of job offers received by other unemployed workers. Since 
greater selectivity involves passing up poor job matches, the average 
quality  of  matching  is  impr0~ed.l~  Greater  unemployment  benefits 
worsen the external diseconomy from too little search but, up to a point, 
improve the external economy from rejecting bad jobs. Without substan- 
tial evidence, I take the second effect to be more important than the first. 
This then creates a case for unemployment compensation even if  workers 
are risk  neutral.  The question  at hand, however,  is whether  trade- 
impacted workers differ from other workers. They may well since they 
may be making larger changes in both locations and industries than the 
typical worker. Whether empirically this is the case and whether theoreti- 
cally this would imply a larger optimal benefit are questions I cannot 
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Unemployment compensation distinguishes a number of worker char- 
acteristics in determining benefits-recent  work for eligibility,  wage level 
for benefit level and replacement rate, presence of dependents for addi- 
tional benefits in some states. There are many other characteristics which 
are not distinguished. In particular, age affects employability. Another 
question for future research is whether trade-impacted workers differ 
from typical insured workers in ways which would justify larger or longer 
benefits but which are not distinguished in the determination of benefits. 
Of  course, there remains the argument that additional adjustment 
assistance is needed to offset desired protection. 
5.6  Open and Closed Economies 
Industries decline for many reasons.  Is there  any good reason  to 
distinguish industries by whether the decline comes from rising imports or 
increased production elsewhere in the domestic economy? (This is sepa- 
rate from the issue that domestic politics are different in the two cases and 
the question whether one should distinguish declining industries from 
other sources of low wages and unemployment .)  My casual impression is 
that the answer is no (ignoring macroissues as is encouraged by interna- 
tional agreements). That is, if  one introduced the A’ industry to the 
model in section 5.2 in place of international trade, the analysis would be 
similar if  the fall in pA came from  increased productivity in  the A’ 
industry. The lack of difference between open and closed economies may 
be enhanced by the fact that the optimal policies in the face of  serious 
decline retain the flow of workers out of industry A by combining adjust- 
ment assistance with protection. Of course, with a domestic A’ industry it 
may be administratively difficult to distinguish the A and A ’ industries in 
the design of  protective policies. 
While the similarity of conclusions  in open and closed economies seems 
strong, let me end on a cautionary note.  Protection  and adjustment 
assistance are predicated on government policies that contribute to indus- 
try decline (e.g., reduced  tariffs) and not just industry decline. This 
distinction has been ignored in this paper. There is an analogy in the 
much studied provision of the United States Constitution that the govern- 
ment not take property without just compensation. It might be worth- 
while to explore that analogy.’’ 
5.7  Concluding Remarks 
I have focused on the purely economic basis for both protection and 
adjustment assistance policies. In the absence of  perfect income redis- 
tribution  and perfect  certainty  about future economic development , 
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mentation to consider the political role of  these two policies in affecting 
trade policy. 
Appendix A  Nonlinear Model 
Assume that capital is immobile and output is determined by the produc- 
tion functions FA (s(NA -  N(c)))  and FB(sNB  + N(c)).  Then movement 
is determined by  the equation 
(All  CLS~AFA  =pBFb-  Pc*. 
In addition to the direct effect on incomes when protection is decreased 
or trade adjustment assistance increased, there is the indirect effect that 
the induced increase in movement raises wages in the A industry and 
lowers them in the B industry. 
Next, we examine the effect of  mobility or total capital income 
In addition to the direct effect of  changes in  (Y and P on capital income, 
there is an indirect effect 
where E~ is the elasticity of  the marginal product with respect to effective 
labor. This indirect effect reflects three elements. Workers lose their 
skills upon switching industries. Thus, they contribute less to effective 
labor in the new industry than in the old. Any difference in elasticities 
between industries implies different magnitudes of  wage bill increases 
and decreases in the two industries from a transfer of the same amount of 
effective  labor between industries. The presence of  moving costs implies 
that the values of marginal products are not equal in the two industries. 
Thus the effect in the high-marginal-product industry is of greater impor- 
tance. 
This analysis rests critically on the particular assumption made con- 
cerning the way that skilled and unskilled labor enter the production 
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Appendix B 
The model in section 5.2 assumed that all workers were the same, apart 
from moving costs. Here we introduce a second difference-skill  in the B 
industry  should the worker move. Thus we have a double index for 
workers (sB,  c), with m (sB,  c) as the density of the index among A workers 
(m  is not normalized to integrate to one). Workers with high sB and low c 
will choose to move. 
For a given ci and p we define the critical value for movement si  (c; 
a$)  by the equality of  incomes in the two industries: 
(A41  WpA =  s$PB -  pc. 
We write the level of  movement in the absence of intervention as s$  (c). 
We shall only consider cases where  some movement  is desirable.  As 
before, we assume poll taxes are used to finance the subsidies. 
Social welfare can be written as a function of  ci and p: 
w(a,p)=v(WpA -  T)(NA  -&“S~m(sB,c)dsBdC) 
(A51  +  So” SE;“ v  (~BPB  -  PC -  T)  m  (SB,  C) dsB dc 
+ v(sPB - 
where F;  = sg (c, a,  p)  and where taxes satisfy 
(NA +  NB)  T=  (a  -  1)spA (NA -  So”JFm(sg,~)  dsBdc) 
+ (1 -  P>JcJ;~m(~g,~)dsBdc.  (A61 
As before, we define 7  as the average marginal utility  of  income of 
taxpayers. For convenience we write the equilibrium number of  movers 
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= -  J"JTc(v'  -  7)mdsBdc - 
0  SB  PB 
These equations are similar in form to those in section 5.2 when only one 
policy variable was employed. (The similarity would be more striking if 
the cutoff were written as c*(s~)  rather than si(c).)  In the absence of 
intervention (a =  1, p  =  1, si  =  sg)  we  see that  aW/da>O  and 
aW/ap<O, assuming that movers have lower incomes than the average 
taxpayer. 
Given the level of protection, adjustment assistance encourages move- 
ment by  those with higher costs and lower skills in the B industry than 
would  be  efficient. This inefficiency is the source of  the second-best 
nature of the results. The net effect of  both policies on the size of  the A 
industry can be written as 
0 
M* -  Mo  = J"JIBm(sB,c)dsBdc. 
O  sB 
(A91 
Without restrictions on m,  this need not be signed at the optimal policy. If 
the distribution is uniform over some region (with c ranging fromc  to F), 
we can use (A7) to sign the difference in movement: 
(M* -  Mo)  = mJF(si  -  si)dc<O.  -  (A10) 
Thus the inefficiency in induced movement and the desire to aid those 
with low incomes result in a larger A industry than would occur without 
intervention.  Presumably  different  assumptions  on  the  differences 
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Appendix c  Relation to More General Models 
The model in the text has been made startlingly simple to bring out the 
essentials of  the analysis. In the conference discussion, questions were 
raised as to the implications of taking the simple version literally. In this 
appendix I discuss general ways of extending the model to deal with the 
questions raised. These extensions are consistent with the basic idea of a 
small A  industry and a large B  industry representing the rest of  the 
economy. 
1. Moving costs. The technology of  moving workers between indus- 
tries was unspecified. With no change in the analysis we could have 
moving be done by  B workers who have equal productivity in the B 
industry or the moving industry. Alternatively, moving can simply use the 
output of  the B industry. 
2.  Intertemporal setting. The model has a single period. If we append a 
future to the economy, moving workers will presumably acquire skills in 
the B industry. The difference between the marginal products of  skilled 
and unskilled workers then  represents the difference in present dis- 
counted values given the different trajectories of  marginal products of 
already skilled and presently unskilled workers. 
3.  Initial position. The model has a single period. If  we append a past 
to the economy, we must be sure we can find one which yields the posited 
initial position. In conventional trade theory, the assumed linear technol- 
ogy would have led to specialization. This implausible and unrealistic 
knife-edge character of equilibrium is easily removed by the introduction 
of nonlinear technology or differences among workers. As an example of 
the latter, there might be moving costs from geographically disbursed 
initial positions at completion of  schooling to job locations in the two 
industries. Then both industries will exist for a range of  initial positions. 
Similarly, there could be differing comparative advantages in learning 
different initial skills. Alternatively,  once we  recognize the reality of 
transport costs we can again have both industries. Since the B industry 
represents the rest of  the economy, it could be disaggregated to several 
industries, some of which are coming into existence at the same time that 
the A industry is declining. 
4. Nonconsumption of  A  goods. The analysis of  each  of  the  two 
policies used  no restrictions  on worker  utility functions (other than 
regularity). In attempting to distinguish the cases when each of  them is 
superior, the simplifying assumption was added that workers did not 
consume the output of  the A industry. This was the limiting case of the 
perspective that the A industry is small in this economy-we  can ignore 
the utility effect of a fall in the price of shoes. Even with this assumption 
no satisfactory condition was found for the two regions of superiority of 
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set of consumers (e.g., capitalists) would permit the same assumption on 
workers and the continued production and import of  A goods. 
Notes 
1. Assistance is also available to towns. This raises the interesting question of the relative 
merits of  encouraging movement of workers and of  jobs. 
2. This is a substantial assumption. There are many other ways in which workers differ. 
For an extension of this model to one further dimension of difference, see appendix B. 
3.  We assume the restrictions a  2 1, 0 5  p 5  1. That is, subsidization of  moving costs 
beyond 100 percent is assumed to result in unacceptable levels of moving costs because of 
the moral hazard problem. 
4. We assume  that the government  is  free to select  the  movers when  everyone  is 
indifferent to moving. Otherwise there is, strictly, no optimum and we want to be as close as 
possible to this point. 
5. Taxes per capita are given in (14). This expression is minimized when c*  = cz. 
6. This assumes that the A industry is small relative to the B industry. 
7. That is, we assume aspa <  pB  when a  is arbitrary or optimal. 
8. See Hart (1975) and Diamond (1980). 
9  It is not an acceptable argument against further redistributive policies that the existing 
income tax is the outcome of a democratic political process. If further redistributive policies 
are accepted, then they too become the outcome of  a democratic political process. 
10. For an analysis of  income taxation  in a many-commodity  economy see Mirrlees 
(1976). 
11. In addition to the Mirrlees reference above see Akerlof  (undated). 
12. See Feldstein (1976), Mortensen (1979), and Diamond (1981). 
13. From an efficiency perspective this is more important than the external diseconomies 
to workers who otherwise would have found these jobs. (See Mortensen 1979.) 
14. See Diamond (1981). Both this paper and that of Mortensen assume workers are, ex 
ante, identical. It would be good to have analysis of these issues where workers and jobs 
differ systematically ex ante. 
15.  It has been suggested that there is a fruitful analogy between the problem studied 
here and the question of  the assignment of liability. The latter question involves a technolo- 
gical externality. However, the question studied here is, at base, a pecuniary externality. 
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COInment  John S.  Chipman 
Diamond postulates a two-commodity open economy with a Ricardian 
technology, in which there are two special features: (a)  workers’ skills are 
specific to the industries in which they are initially employed, and their 
marginal productivity in these industries is s times what it would be in the 
alternative industries (s > 1);  (6)  there are moving costs to switching from 
one industry to the other. 
Most of  the complicated analytics of  the paper flow from feature (6). 
The moving costs are stipulated to be “financial,” and yet we are told that 
“this  model  does not  violate  any  assumptions of  the Arrow-Debreu 
model.” If  the latter statement is  true, moving must  use  up real re- 
sources-either domestic or foreign. If  domestic, one would like to see 
some explicit assumptions about the form of  the production function for 
moving. The one-period formulation  also appears to exaggerate the 
importance of moving: moving is a once-for-all decision, whereas income 
is earned period after period. For younger people, the cost of  moving 
may be considered to be quite low compared with the present value of the 
interindustry differential in wages. Since I have doubts concerning the 
importance of  moving costs-which  in any event are not given a precise 
formulation in terms of resource use in this paper-and  since, moreover, 
many of the difficulties I have with the paper subsist even if  moving costs 
are ignored, I shall confine the remainder of my remarks to a discussion of 
these difficulties. 
John S.  Chipman is Regents’ Professor of Economics, University of  Minnesota. He is the 
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Fig. C5.1 
One unanswered question is, How is it that in the initial situation, all 
workers are skilled in their trades? The only plausible answer is that they 
learned them on the job. One then wonders why they are assumed not to 
be able to acquire skills in new trades. 
If  some learning process led the economy to the initial equilibrium-so 
that  the initial equilibrium may  be  regarded  as one of  the  classical 
Mill-Graham variety-then  if  the country is truly a “small country,” it 
would have been specializing  in a single export good (commodity B). But 
on the contrary it is assumed to produce both goods; so it must have been 
a “large country,” whose cost ratio dominated the world price ratio in 
Graham fashion. But then what reason would there be for the world price 
ratio to change? 
Setting aside the above perplexities, let us accept the hypotheses and 
see what they imply. In figure C5.1 I show a straight-line Ricardian 
production-possibility frontier FF indicating the long-run transformation 
rate  (in the  absence  of  learning)  between  the outputs yA and yB of 
commodities A and B (the import and export good, respectively), which I 
also take  to indicate  the initial price  ratio.  Behind it  is  the  broken 
linear-programming type of  production-possibility frontier F’  ’PF” re- 147  Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution 
Fig. C5.2 
sulting from feature (a).  If  the import price falls, the price line will swing 
counterclockwise around the initial production equilibrium point P, to 
the position  F’F’  , say.  Given  any Bergson-Samuelson social-welfare 
function, with optimal lump-sum transfers the economy would move to a 
higher social indifference curve, from C  to C’, as shown. On the other 
hand, it is an immediate consequence of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
that real wages of the workers specific to the import-competing industry 
would decline and those of  the workers specific to the export industry 
would rise. Diamond is concerned with devising a compensation scheme 
that would equalize workers’ incomes and at the same time encourage 
workers to move out of  the import-competing industry should the fall in 
import prices be so great as to require it (see figure C5.2).  In the absence 
of  moving costs, as figure C5.2 makes clear, the country would have to 
specialize in its export good henceforth, at the point P‘; Diamond’s 
moving costs are what prevent the efficient outcome from being a corner 
solution. 
Or are they? Diamond states, “TO  compare alternative policies, let us 
assume that workers do not consume the output of  the A industry, so that 
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assumption, either no amount of  the A  good will be produced  (i.e., 
production and consumption will be at P' in figure C5.3)  and hence there 
will be no trade-either before or after the price change; or some of the A 
good will be produced (say at P in figure C5.4) but it will all be exported 
(consumption being at C in figure C5.4).  In neither case will there be any 
imports of commodity A.  How can workers be damaged by the influx of 
cheap Japanese cars unless someone is buying cheap Japanese cars? 
My final perplexity has to do with the absence of any consideration of 
incentives. Unless there is a wage differential between the two industries, 
or  some other inducement, what is to provide the incentive for workers to 
improve their skills in their new jobs? This Page Intentionally Left Blank